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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-SELF-INCRIMINATION-TAXPAYER CANNOT CLAIM
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION To PREVENT PRODUCTION OF
RECORDS IN POSSESSION OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT AT TIME ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE SUMMONS ISSUED.-Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973).
Since 1955 petitioner, Lillian Couch, had given her accountant,
Harold Schaffer, various records relating to her restaurant business to
enable him to prepare her federal income tax returns. Schaffer operated
as an independent contractor, having his own office and doing business
with several clients. Mrs. Couch retained title to all records that she
turned over to Schaffer.
In 1969 Mrs. Couch's tax returns became the objects of an investi-
gation by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service. With Schaffer's
permission, the agent conducted a preliminary examination of Mrs.
Couch's records at Schaffer's office. When the preliminary examination
indicated a major understatement of gross income, a special agent'
entered the investigation to determine the existence of tax fraud and
the potential imposition of criminal penalties upon Mrs. Couch.
After giving Mrs. Couch Miranda warnings, 2 the special agent
served Schaffer with an administrative summons3 upon the latter's re-
1. A revenue agent cannot investigate criminal tax fraud. His function is to ascer-
tain the taxpayer's correct civil tax liability. A special agent must conduct the investiga-
tion into criminal tax fraud. Thus, upon discovering indications of tax fraud, the revenue
agent must suspend his investigation and notify the Intelligence Division. If the special
agent's preliminary investigation reveals the need for a complete investigation, it is con-
ducted jointly by the revenue agent and the special agent under the aegis of the latter.
See Lipton, Constitutional Protection for Books and Records in Tax Fraud Investigations,
N.Y.U. 29TH INSTrruTE ON FED. TAX 945, 977-78 (1971); Taylor, The Commissioner's Sum-
mons-Its Scope-Who May Object, N.Y.U. 27TH INSTrrUTE ON FED. TAX 1383, 1411 & n.136
(1969); United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968, 974-75 (C.D. Cal. 1969), afJ'd, 425 F.2d
1069 (9th Cir. 1970). No steps toward collection or settlement of civil tax liability are
taken during a criminal investigation or when a recommendation for a criminal prosecu-
tion is likely or has been made. See Lipton, Constitutional Issues in Tax Fraud Cases, 55
A.B.A.J. 731, 732 (1969); United States v. Jakiewicz, 278 F. Supp. 525, 536-37 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
2. The warnings are given pursuant to Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 949 in CCH
1968 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 6946. The warning is not constitutionally required in the
usual case in which the taxpayer is not in custody, although it had been held that the
warnings were constitutionally compelled at the time the case was transferred to the
Intelligence Division. United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The
decision in Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), requiring Miranda warnings for
custodial tax fraud investigations, has been widely interpreted as overruling the view
taken in Turzynski. See United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1969); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34
(8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785
(2d Cir. 1968).
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fusal to permit an examination of his client's books and records and
of Schaffer's workpapers.4 At Mrs. Couch's request, Schaffer thereafter
transferred the subpoenaed documents to her attorney. The special
agent responded by seeking enforcement of the summons in federal dis-
trict court,5 and Mrs. Couch intervened, asserting the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination as a defense to production of the
documents. The district court6 and the court of appeals7 agreed that
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602, provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable
for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his
delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time
and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or
other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
4. The summons directed the production of "[a]I books, records, bank statements,
cancelled checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and all other pertinent documents
pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer." 409 U.S. at 323.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(a), provides:
If any person summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by
appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books,
papers, records, or other data.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(b), provides:
Whenever any person summoned under section ... 7602 neglects or refuses to
obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give
testimony, as required, the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the judge of the
district court or to a United States commissioner for the district within which the
person so summoned resides or is found for an attachment against him as for a
contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear the application,
and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper
officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before him to
proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such hearing the judge or the United
States commissioner shall have power to make such order as he shall deem proper,
not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience
to the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his default or
disobedience.
6. The opinion of the District Court for the Western District of Virginia is not re-
ported. See 409 U.S. at 324 n.3 for a summary of the holding.
7. United States v. Couch, 449 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1971).
1973]
Florida State University Law Review
Mrs. Couch could not legitimately raise a fifth amendment bar to
production of the records. Affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court held that the taxpayer could not invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination to bar production of books and records owned by
her but in the actual possession of her accountant at the time the ad-
ministrative summons issued.8 The Court viewed protection from per-
sonal compulsion directed toward the individual asserting the privilege
for himself as the crux of the fifth amendment's purpose and thus re-
jected mere ownership of subpoenaed property as the criterion for a
valid assertion of the privilege, while emphasizing the role of possession.
The administrative summons is an element of the inquisitorial
powers of the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as the
Service).9 Use of the summons has been the exception rather than the
rule. It is used only after the "taxpayer or third party has rejected the
agent's informal request to inspect the desired records." 10 In the course
of the normal investigation, the taxpayer is first contacted by a revenue
agent who is concerned with the correct assessment of the taxpayer's
civil tax liability. In most instances the taxpayer willingly cooperates
with the revenue agent because the taxpayer hopes to facilitate a settle-
ment.1 He does so by producing records, giving statements and making
explanations-all of which could strengthen the government's case in
the event of a subsequent criminal prosecution of the taxpayer.' 2 The
production of records is often made by taxpayers inadequately apprised
of a possible future criminal prosecution in their case.'8 The taxpayer
is thus initially confronted with a choice between voluntary coopera-
tion (delivering the records to the agent) and refusal (ordinarily evok-
ing the issuance of an administrative summons), often in contemplation
of invoking the fifth amendment to bar production of the subpoenaed
documents.
8. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
9. See Ritholz, The Commissioner's Inquisitorial Powers, 45 TAxEs 782 (1967).
10. Taylor, supra note 1, at 1383.
11. See Note, Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitations on the Scope of the
Section 7602 Summons, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 114 (1972).
12. The government can make a prima facie criminal case of tax evasion against the
taxpayer by using either the taxpayer's records or direct testimony to show that a sub-
stantial portion of the defendant's gross income was not included in his tax return. The
taxpayer then would have to provide evidence of mistake, ignorance or honest motives.
See Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966).
13. It is interesting to note, however, that
[m]ore than 99% of audits which reveal deficiencies are never treated as criminal
cases; for if at least half of all audits result in deficiencies, then there were at least
1,700,000 deficiencies revealed by audits in 1965. . . . Yet less than 9,000 (.5%)
were fraud audits and only 1216 (.07%) produced recommendations for prosecution.
Id. at 35 n.159.
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The transaction presented in Couch-a post-summons, third party
transfer of taxpayer-owned records from the accountant either to the
taxpayer or to the taxpayer's attorney-is one that the lower courts
had generally agreed did not allow the taxpayer to prevent production
of the documents by raising the fifth amendment. 14 Although the re-
cipient of an administrative summons may not ignore it without pen-
alty,1 5 he retains the right to raise a good faith refusal to produce and
await an enforcement proceeding in federal district court.16 As Couch
demonstrates, however, the issuance of the administrative summons
fixes the point in time at which the standing to assert a legitimate fifth
amendment claim to prevent production of the documents must at-
tach, if it is ever to do so. Any transfer subsequent to the issuance of
the administrative summons will be ignored as a sham,'7 for purposes
of determining the legitimacy of a refusal to produce papers, if the re-
fusal is founded upon the fifth amendment. Couch approved this view,
emphasizing that a post-summons transfer cannot create constitutional
privileges not existing when the summons was served. Even before
Couch, however, the lower courts generally agreed that a return to the
taxpayer of papers belonging to the taxpayer before service of the ad-
ministrative summons but after the taxpayer learned of the investiga-
14. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971) (dictum); United
States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
15. The recipient of an administrative summons issued under § 7602 must appear
before a hearing officer and either interpose good faith challenges to the summons or
produce the requested documents. If he fails to appear or appears but refuses either to
produce or to advance good faith objections to the summons, he is subject to a maximum
fine of $1,000, a maximum prison sentence of one year, or both, plus costs of prosecution.
See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1964). Perhaps the most frequently raised
"good faith" objection is that the material is sought for use in a criminal prosecution. A
summons issued solely to obtain evidence for use in a criminal tax fraud prosecution is
illegal, but so long as both civil and criminal charges are being investigated, the sum-
mons is valid. See id. at 449; United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States
v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 975 (1972); DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 103 (6th Cir. 1969); Wild v.
United States, 362 F.2d 206, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1966). It has also been urged that production
would violate the attorney-client privilege. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. at 449; note
19 infra. A non exhaustive list of the various other improper purposes includes harrass-
ment, applying pressure to the taxpayer to settle another collateral dispute, and various
bad faith prosecutions. See Garbis & Burke, Fifth Amendment Protection of the Ac-
countant's Workpapers in Tax Fraud Investigations, 47 TAxES 12, 21 (1969); United States
v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 900 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
16. See note 5 supra; Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446-50 (1964). Enforcement
proceedings are sought under § 7402(b) or under § 7604.
17. See United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v.
Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); cf. United
States v. Baldridge, 281 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex. 1968), vacated as moot, 406 F.2d 526 (5th
Cir. 1969).
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tion was a valid procedure to establish the fifth amendment privilege.' 8
For fifth amendment purposes a pre-summons transfer of records and
workpapers to the taxpayer's attorney is properly equated with a trans-
fer to the taxpayer.'9 Couch disclaims the establishment of a per se rule
18. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Levy,
270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1967). But see Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th
Cir. 1963).
19. It has been recognized that, at least when dealing with potentially incriminating
documents that are the property of the taxpayer-client, the taxpayer or his attorney can
assert the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to bar produc-
tion of the documents that are in his attorney's actual possession. See United States v.
Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969), afj'd sub nor. Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517 (1971) (dictum); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (dictum); United States v. White, 326
F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum); Application
of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
When dealing with the taxpayer's ability to raise the fifth amendment to prevent the
production of accountant's workpapers, not belonging to the taxpayer, several courts
have indicated that they would not allow the taxpayer to prevail in his privilege claim.
See United States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. at 842; United States v. White, 326 F. Supp. at
463. A decision sometimes thought to be in disagreement with the statements above con-
cerning taxpayer's property is Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
But that decision supports only the latter proposition that accountant's workpapers, not
belonging to the taxpayer whose attorney holds them, can not be withheld by the tax-
payer's assertion of the fifth amendment. See id. at 456. Some decisions appear to draw
no distinction based upon ownership. See In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961).
The rationale for the distinction often drawn between accountant's workpapers and
taxpayer's records in the cases is founded upon ownership. The general view seems to be
that the taxpayer can assert a valid fifth amendment claim to prevent the production of
subpoenaed documents that are in his attorney's actual possession provided that the
documents would have been accorded fifth amendment protection were they in the tax-
payer's actual possession. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d at 463-66. Thus, the ques-
tion is often a derivative of the question discussed at pp. 518-25 infra of whether the tax-
payer actually holding subpoenaed accountant's workpapers may refuse to return them
to their owner by asserting the fifth amendment. Cf. United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp.
370 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
The Supreme Court's decision in Couch did not directly address these questions. Yet
the decision's emphasis upon personal compulsion and its apparent denigration of owner-
ship as a standard for fifth amendment purposes may portend important restrictions
upon the standing of a taxpayer whose attorney holds subpoenaed documents belonging
to the accountant. The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. White, 477
F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussed at pp. 522-25 infra), provides an excellent example.
A related argument has been that the attorney-client privilege applies to records
transferred by the accountant to the attorney prior to the issuance of the summons. The
courts have rejected the argument because of prior disclosure of the documents to third
parties (usually accountants), thus creating a lack of confidentiality, and because of the
so-called "pre-existing documents rule" of evidence. The latter rule removes records and
workpapers in existence before the commencement of the attorney-client relationship
from the privilege normally attending that relationship. See United States v. White, 326
F. Supp. at 462. See also United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); C. Mc-
CoRMIcK, EvmENcE 186-94 (1954); Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 74 YALE
L.J. 539 (1965). It is important to note that the attorney-client privilege applies to
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requiring physical possession by the taxpayer in all circumstances. Con-
sequently, a pre-summons transfer to the attorney of documents po-
tentially incriminating to his client should not destroy the client's
standing to prevent production of the documents, because the taxpayer
constructively possesses records that are actually held by his attorney
for use in preparing the taxpayer's defense in a potential criminal
prosecution by the government.20 While some courts have refused to
recognize that an attorney's possession of his client's papers imputes
constructive possession to the client,2 1 the sounder view requires no
forfeiture of the fifth amendment privilege when a taxpayer transfers
his tax records to his attorney to aid the latter in preparing for the
taxpayer's defenseY2 Were constructive possession not recognized in
such situations, defendants would be unable to obtain effective legal
representation without sacrificing their ability to exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination. The emphasis upon personal compulsion in
Couch, however, may be interpreted to militate against the latter
view.2 3
Although petitioner had raised two issues in her defense,24 the
Couch opinion addressed almost exclusively the claim of fifth amend-
ment privilege. The accountant upon whom the administrative sum-
mons was served had possession of documents of which the taxpayer
was the owner before the post-summons transfer occurred . 2  Because
workpapers prepared by the accountant at the attorney's request to aid in the representa-
tion of his client. See note 48 infra. This privilege was incorporated in rule 503(a) and (b)
of the proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts and Magistrates.
Finally, it is noteworthy that, so far, the courts have refused to apply the "required
records doctrine" to those taxpayers' records whose maintenance is obligatory upon all
taxpayers under § 6001 of the Internal Revenue Code. In essence the doctrine provides
that one's records are not subject to fifth amendment protection if their maintenance is
congressionally required and the records are of a public nature. See Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Taylor, supra note
1, at 1395-96.
20. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Ainsworth in United States v. White, 477
F.2d 757, 765-66 (5th Cir. 1973).
21. See, e.g., Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. CI. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973); see pp. 518-25 infra.
24. In addition to her fifth amendment defense, petitioner had claimed infringement
of her fourth amendment rights. Although this claim was raised in the district court, it
was not pressed in the Supreme Court, and it was treated as subsumed in the petitioner's
fifth amendment claim. 409 U.S. at 325-26 n.6. In addition the Court raised and disposed of
whether the summons was issued for an improper purpose. Because the case presented
both civil and criminal characteristics for the taxpayer, the propriety of the summons
was sustained. See note 15 supra.
25. Actually, the order to produce the documents was directed to the taxpayer's at.
torney, who obtained possession after the summons was served on the accountant. The
Supreme Court explained, however, that "[t]he rights and obligations of the parties be-
came fixed when the summons was served, and the transfer did not alter them." 409 U.S.
1973]
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the fifth amendment privilege is a highly personal one, the vital pre-
condition to its invocation-personal compulsion directed against the
potentially incriminated party-was absent in Couch. The summons
was directed to the accountant only, and he raised no fifth amendment
claim for himself.
In its rejection of an ownership standard for gauging the validity
of an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege, the Court stressed the
irrationality of conditioning standing to raise the privilege upon own-
ership of the subpoenaed documents. 26 The accountant's workpapers
and any copies that he might make of his client's records would nor-
mally be the accountant's property.27 Thus, under a test based upon
ownership, neither the workpapers nor the copies would be protected
by the taxpayer's privilege claim. Yet the taxpayer's records, from which
both the workpapers and the copies were created, would be within the
fifth amendment's protection. In addition to producing anomalous re-
sults, an ownership standard would improperly emphasize both the
form of communication between the client and his accountant and the
latter's working methods, rather than the basic purpose of the fifth
amendment-protection from personal compulsion.28 Couch's rejection
of an unvarying rule that would have made ownership the determina-
tive precondition to a valid assertion of the fifth amendment focuses
future analysis upon the role of possession.2 9 Possession has assumed a
at 329 n.9; see United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1021 (1969) (post-summons transfer characterized as a "mere attempt to thwart
the government investigation'); cf. United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971)
(dictum); United States v. Baldridge, 281 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex. 1968), vacated as moot,
406 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969) (five separate pre-summons transfers with accountant who
first transferred the papers ending up in possession; dicta that transfer of workpapers
after investigation has begun should be subjected to careful scrutiny). It should be noted
that Couch did not discuss workpapers belonging to the accountant. See p. 518 infra.
26. 409 U.S. at 331.
27. See United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F,2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1021 (1969).
28. 409 U.S. at 331.
29. Id. at 333. The Court also disposed of three decisions advanced in support of an
ownership test. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (discussed at greater length
at pp. 514-15 infra), involved a production order directed to one holding both possession
and title to the documents sought and thus could not be read to support the proposition
for which petitioner sought to invoke it. 409 U.S. at 330-31. In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465 (1921), the petitioner, who was suspected of mail fraud, sought return of certain
incriminating papers from a government attorney who was about to present them to a
federal grand jury. The papers were stolen from the petitioner-owner's office safe and
desk. Petitioner sought return of the papers as their rightful owner, depicting the gov-
ernment as a wrongful possessor. After finding that the government took no part in the
theft, the Court rejected petitioner's fourth and fifth amendment claims, noting that even
a subpoena served upon the thieves would occasion neither an unreasonable search and
[Vol. I
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critical, albeit not always determinative, position in the hierarchy of
criteria used in evaluating a fifth amendment claim because of its ob-
vious and direct relationship to personal compulsion.
The Court was careful to point out, however, that its refusal to
establish a per se rule recognized some exceptions founded upon the
concept of "constructive possession." Referring to Schwimmer v. United
States30 and to United States v. Guterma3' as examples, the Court cau-
tioned that "situations may well arise where constructive possession is
so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and in-
significant as to leave the personal compulsion upon the accused sub-
stantially intact.' ' 32 Both cases involved grand jury subpoenas duces
tecum issued to third party corporations in whose physical possession
the parties under investigation or indictment for tax evasion had placed
records belonging to the investigated parties. In Schwimmer an at-
torney, who was personally under investigation, closed his office, put
his files in storage with an uninvolved corporation, and left for Puerto
Rico. When the grand jury sought production of his records, the at-
torney raised only a fourth amendment claim against unreasonable
search and seizure. The court quashed the subpoenas. Finding the
corporate possessor "merely a custodian, without personal right in the
books and papers as such," the court imputed constructive possession
of the documents to their owner.33 In Guterma the subpoena ordering
production of Guterma's personal books and records was directed to a
corporation of which Guterma was chairman of the board. Guterma
had placed the records in a safe in his corporate office, and only he and
seizure nor compel the accused to testify against himself. Id. at 476. In Perlman v. United
States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), Perlman sought to obtain certain exhibits, which belonged to
him, that he had used in court in a prior patent infringment suit. After dismissal of the
infringement action, the court ordered the evidence preserved and impounded the ex-
hibits without objection by Perlman. Later, the United States sought to use the exhibits
as evidence against Perlman in a grand jury proceeding. The Court rejected Perlman's
ownership plea:
But Perlman insists that he owned the exhibits and appears to contend that his
ownership exempted them from any use by the Government without his consent.
The extent of the insistence is rather elusive of measurement. It seems to be that
the owner of property must be considered as having a constructive possession of it
wherever it be and in whosesoever hands it be, and it is always, therefore, in a
kind of asylum of constitutional privilege. And to be of avail the contention must
be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed, however, by all the cited cases. They, as
we have said, make the criterion of immunity not the ownership of property but
the "physical or moral compulsion" exerted.
Id. at 15; see 409 U.S. at 331-33 & n.14.
30. 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
31. 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959).
32. 409 U.S. at 333 & n.16.
33. 232 F.2d at 860.
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another defendant knew the safe's combination. The government's
argument that Guterma could assert no legitimate fifth amendment
claim because he was a "stranger" not in possession of the documents
failed, the court finding constructive possession in Guterma. The
corporation's lack of access to the safe was crucial, if not determina-
tive.3 4 The court reasoned that once the corporate possessor delivered
the safe to the court, Guterma, as the holder of the combination, would
ultimately be the one to produce his papers. Thus, said the court, serv-
ice upon the corporation was service upon Guterma.
Justice Brennan concurred in Couch on the understanding that the
decision established no per se rule. He would extend the class of ex-
ceptions, however, to encompass the circumstances present in Stuart
v. United States,35 a decision not mentioned by the majority. Because
it involved an administrative summons issued by a revenue agent plus
a post-summons transfer from the taxpayer's accountant to the taxpayer,
Stuart seems a more appropriate decision for discussion than either
Schwimmer or Guterma. In Stuart the taxpayer, who worked nights and
slept days, initially transferred her records to the accountant to facili-
tate their examination by a revenue agent. After the civil investigation
indicated possible fraud, a special agent served an administrative sum-
mons upon the accountant, who then returned the records to the tax-
payer. Enforcement of the summons was ultimately denied on the
ground that the possessor-accountant was (unlike the accountant in
Couch) a mere "custodial bailee" of the papers, performing no pro-
fessional services in connection with them The Court was also care-
ful to point out that Couch works no change in the established Service
practice whereby a taxpayer may raise the fifth amendment to prevent
production of any of his documents that are being used by his em-
ployees or by others on the taxpayer's premises. Mrs. Couch's account-
ant was not her employee, nor was he using the records on her prem-
ises.3 7
In his dissent, Justice Douglas found Mrs. Couch's records within a
protected "sphere of privacy" delineated by the fourth and fifth amend-
34. 272 F.2d at 346. The subpoena also included the records of a corporation wholly
owned by Guterma. The court noted that the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination does not apply to corporations. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944) (unincorporated association-labor union); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2145 (1973); United States v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 349 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Ellsworth, 460 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1972).
35. 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969).
36. Id. at 462-63. United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370, 377 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
suggests that Couch may have overruled Stuart.
37. 409 U.S. at 334 & n.18.
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ments s that was supposedly recognized in Boyd v. United States.9 In
Boyd a federal statute vested the power in attorneys representing the
United States in certain civil proceedings under the revenue laws to
require defendants to produce documents material to the investigation
under penalty of having the government's allegations against them
taken as confessed. The documents sought were invoices for twenty-
nine cases of plate glass allegedly imported in evasion of the revenue
laws. The Court found the statute to be a violation of the fourth and
fifth amendments.4 0 Unlike the situation presented in Couch, however,
the accused in Boyd was both owner and possessor of the subpoenaed
documents. The Boyd opinion also contained the "roots" of the mere
evidence rule, which made items of "evidential" value only virtually
unseizable by warrant or otherwise. 41 Under the mere evidence rule,
only fruits of the crime, instrumentalities by which the crime was com-
mitted, weapons, and property whose possession was itself a crime were
proper objects of search and seizure under the fourth amendment.42
The Boyd Court noted that, in cases involving compelled production of
evidential items, the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into
each other":
[A]ny... compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime . . . is
within . . . condemnation .... In this regard the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other" 3
The continuing validity of the view expressed in Boyd is questionable
in light of the abrogation of the mere evidence rule in Warden v.
Hayden." Although the "mere evidence" in Warden were articles of
clothing (nontestimonial in nature and thus not engendering the seri-
ous implications for personal privacy that personal documents might),
38. Id. at 339-40.
39. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40. Id.
41. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 110, 113 (1967).
42. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
43. 116 U.S. at 630.
44. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Boyd quoted at length from the landmark English decision
of Entick v. Carrington & Three Other King's Messengers, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029
(1765). Dictum in Boyd indicated that the government could lawfully seize items in which
the public or the complainant possesses an interest or holds a right to possession. The class
of items thus subject to seizure ("mere evidence") included instrumentalities and fruits
of the crime and contraband. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). This
reasoning directed that one's private papers could not be the objects of a search or
seizure because the government had no property interest in them; they were mere evi-
dence- Id.
1973]
Florida State University Law Review [Vol. 1
Justice Douglas dissented there and he repeated that dissent in Couch.
The Warden decision contained a caveat that the facts then before the
Court (nontestimonial evidence, viz. articles of clothing) did not re-
quire consideration of "whether there are items of evidential value
whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable
search and seizure. " 45 Since the "principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy, "46 it is apparent that some highly
personal papers are properly afforded protection from search and seiz-
ure under the exceptions provided for in Warden. Whether tax records
are of that nature, while probably best resolved in the negative,47 was
not reached in Couch. The majority rejected the privacy argument for
the taxpayer's records not on the basis of the nature of the records, but
by concluding that no legitimate expectation of privacy could ac-
company the transfer of records to an accountant for the preparation
of tax returns.'8
45. 387 U.S. at 303. Compare Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971), with United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1972). The latter
decision questions the reasoning in Philpott and distinguishes the fourth from the fifth
amendment by finding
a valid and important distinction between records sought by subpoena and records
sought by search warrant. The subpoena compels the person receiving it by his
own response to identify the documents delivered as the ones described in the
subpoena. The search warrant involves no such element of compulsion upon an
accused or potential defendant.
Id. at 385. In United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 896 (2d Cir. 1969), Judge Friendly
notes that "the Fourth Amendment does not protect broadly against the seizure of things
whose compulsory production would be forbidden by the Fifth." Finally, the Supreme
Court itself questioned its earlier position in Boyd in the case of Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 72 (1906), when it noted that "[s]ubsequent cases [to Boyd] treat the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments as quite distinct, having different histories, and performing separate
functions." See also The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, supra note 41, at 114-17.
46. 387 U.S. at 304.
47. See Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 150 (7th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).
48. Petitioner's final argument was that the confidential nature of the accountant-
client relationship and her resulting expectation of privacy prevented disclosure of the
documents under the fourth and fifth amendments. The Court dismissed the argument,
concluding that the taxpayer has little justifiable expectation of privacy when his records
are given to an accountant because disclosure of much of the information contained in
the records is required on a tax return. 409 U.S. at 335-36. The question of what informa-
tion is disclosed has been in issue when an attorney prepared the tax return and the
taxpayer subsequently relies on a claim of attorney-client privilege for protection against
disclosure of the records given to the attorney. These cases may be applied by analogy to
the expectation of privacy question. The narrow issue of these cases concerns confidential-
ity, which is one requirement for the attorney-client privilege. In Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963), the court concluded
that information transmitted to an attorney for inclusion in a tax return is not intended
to be confidential. See United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). Contra,
United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Neb. 1970). In Schlegel the court con-
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Dealing with records owned by the taxpayer, the Supreme Court in
Couch discussed the privilege against self-incrimination in terms of
tended "that the client intends that only as much information will be conveyed to the
government as the attorney concludes should be . . . . In short, whatever is finally sent
to the government is what matches the client's intent." See note 19 supra.
The opinion in Couch, while noting that the accountant risks criminal prosecution
for knowingly assisting in the preparation of a false return, erroneously cites 26 U.S.C.
§ 7602(2). The applicable statutory provision is INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 7206(2), which
provides:
Any person who-
(2) Aid or assistance.
Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or
presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal
revenue laws, of a return affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent
or is false as to any material matter whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the
knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return,
affidavit, claim, or document;
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs
of prosecution.
The Court also noted in passing that "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists
under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal
cases. ... 409 U.S. at 335. Questions of privilege in federal income tax investigations
are matters of federal law. See United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970);
Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
The proceedings are not civil in nature. In civil proceedings in the federal courts where
jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship, rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure controls the admissibility of evidence and the competency of witnesses.
Rule 43(a) provides that evidence is admissible when it would be admissible either under
federal law or under the law of the state in which the court sits. See Hyde Constr. Co.
v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1972). It has been suggested that this result
is not mandated by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), after the Supreme Court's
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See Wright, Procedural Reform: Its
Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 572-73 (1967). The same results do not
obtain, however, in criminal prosecutions in the federal courts. The matter of privileges
is there federal in nature. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that "the admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses" are
controlled by the common law as interpreted by the federal courts. No accountant-client
privilege existed at common law and none exists as a matter of federal law.
Both rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were modified to conform to the proposed Rules of Evidence
for United States District Courts and Magistrates. The proposed Rules are intended to
provide all privileges available in the federal courts. The proposed Rules were approved
by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, and were filed in Congress in January 1973.
They do not become final, however, until they receive congressional approval. See Act of
March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The privileges portion of the proposed Rules
(rules 501-13), as approved by the Supreme Court, provided no accountant-client privilege.
The proposed draft of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee alters rule 501 to require application of state (forum) privilege law in civil
actions where jurisdiction is founded upon diversity. See Tent. Subcomm. Draft of H.R.
5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 42 U.S.L.W. No. 3 (Supp.).
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personal compulsion and possession. Previously several circuit court
decisions had discussed the privilege in terms of ownership, holding
that unless title to the subpoenaed documents was vested in the tax-
payer, neither he nor his attorney could invoke the fifth amendment
to prevent production of the documents.4 9 This result was found to
be especially compelling if the accountant had requested either the
return of his workpapers or their delivery to the Service.5 0 While the
Couch summons requested both the accountant's workpapers and the
taxpayer's records,51 the matter of the workpapers was not discussed.
The Court framed the issue more narrowly: "The question is whether
the taxpayer may invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination to prevent the production of her business
and tax records in the possession of her accountant. ' ' 52 Despite the
Court's rather cryptic failure to discuss the workpapers transfer, there
is no reason to think that their transfer would have been treated dif-
ferently from the transfer of the taxpayer's records since both were
part of a single, post-summons transaction.
Couch's emphasis upon personal compulsion could be interpreted
to support the proposition that no matter who owns the workpapers,
the taxpayer can legitimately resist their production by asserting the
fifth amendment if the workpapers are in his possession and were
transferred to him before issuance of the administrative summons.53
A taxpayer in possession of workpapers clearly would be subjected to
personal compulsion were he required to produce them. Ownership is
not material to compulsion. In the past the issue has been complicated,
however, if the summons was addressed to the accountant-owner of the
workpapers and he requested their return from the taxpayer. Although
the issue has produced some division among the courts,54 the most re-
49. See United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (lst Cir. 1971) (dictum); United States
v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); Deck v.
United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965). See also
note 62 infra. Compare United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dis-
missed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959), with Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D.
Cal. 1956).
50. See Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 967 (1965); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961); Garbis & Burke, supra note
15, at 17-18.
51. The summons directed the production of "[a]ll books, records, bank statements,
cancelled checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and all other pertinent documents
pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer." 409 U.S. at 323.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. "The criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity remains not the ownership of
property but the 'physical or moral compulsion exerted.'" Id. at 336; see pp. 520-21 infra.
54. Compare Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
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current view, before Couch, rejected the validity of an assertion of the
privilege in such circumstances.55 The courts often seemed guided by
the "good faith" of the transfer. 56 Such an analysis has required an
initial resolution of the question of workpaper ownership,7 and this,
too, has evoked disagreement. While the rule generally applied is that
the accountant's workpapers are his property unless the contrary is
shown, 58 the courts will look to statutory provisions of the forum or
to written agreements between accountant and client to determine
ownership.60
In its sole reference to the pre-summons transfer of accountant's
workpapers, the Court declined to express a view upon what constitutes
U.S. 967 (1965), and In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961), with United States v.
Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
55. See United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971) (dictum); Deck v. United
States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); United States v.
Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf. United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3d
Cir. 1971).
56. See United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Baldridge, 281 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex. 1968). But cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
330 n.12 (1973). See also United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 469-70 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1967)
(dictum).
57. See United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
58. United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972); United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1021 (1969); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1972); ci. United
States v. Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1967) (issue resolved in taxpayer's favor when
evidence unconvincing either way on ownership).
59. See Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 967 (1965).
FLA. STAT. § 473.191 (1971) provides in part:
All statements, records, schedules and memoranda made by a certified public ac-
countant ... incident to . . . professional service to a client . . . shall be and re-
main the property of such ... accountant ... in the absence of an express agree-
ment between the . . . accountant . . . and the client.
60. In United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959), the court found no demonstration that the workpapers were the
property of the taxpayer although the accountant had filed an affidavit to the effect that
he had transferred the workpapers with no intention of retaining title. In contrast, Ap-
plication of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956), held the taxpayer to be the owner
of workpapers transferred to him although a state statute made workpapers the property
of the accountant. The court found that ownership provision of the statute inapplicable
since an express agreement between the accountant and the client provided that ownership
would become vested in the taxpayer upon transfer of the papers. The statute provided
that such an agreement would control. Id. at 101. Under this view foresight would be-
come invaluable. A written agreement settling workpaper ownership entered into at the
outset of the accountant-client relationship would probably prove determinative of the
ownership issue should subsequent litigation occur.
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"rightful possession enabling the possessor to assert the privilege." 61
The critical words, of course, are "rightful possession." Unless rightful
possession is something less than a unity of ownership and possession,
the fifth amendment would impose different standards depending upon
whether the subpoenaed documents were the property of the account-
ant or of the taxpayer. The Court has largely discarded ownership as
a determinant in ascertaining the validity of fifth amendment claims
where the taxpayer is not in possession of his papers when the adminis-
trative summons issues. Apparently "rightful possession" will determine
the taxpayer's ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination
to bar production of accountant's workpapers that are in the taxpayer's
possession when the administrative summons issues. "Rightful posses-
sion" may also determine the taxpayer's ability to assert the privilege
for such papers that are in his attorney's possession when the summons
issues. Unfortunately, the Court has declined to inject meaning into
the vague concept of "rightful possession."
The view taken by some courts62 that "rightful possession" without
61. 409 U.S. at 330 n.12.
62. While the opinions often allude to "rightful possession" distinct from a unity of
title and possession, see, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144, 1146 (lst Cir. 1971);
United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1972), it is rarely found. See
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); note 59 supra.
The apparent inability of the circuits to evolve a consistent rationale on the concept
of "rightful possession" is well illustrated by the decisions in United States v. Widelski,
452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); United States v. Zakutansky,
401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); United States v. Cohen, 388
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
In Cohen the accountant transferred his workpapers to the taxpayer after the in-
vestigation began but before the issuance of the administrative summons. Complying with
a request by the Service, the accountant asked the taxpayer to return the workpapers. In
upholding the taxpayer's fifth amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to papers held
"free of any duty to surrender them to another." The decision correctly recognizes that
unless a taxpayer may hold papers, title to which rests in another, and block their
production by refusing to return them to their owner, ownership would become a neces-
sary condition to assertion of the fifth amendment. The government also argued that
the taxpayer's retention of the accountant's workpapers in the face of the latter's request
for their return made the taxpayer's possession "wrongful" and thus insufficient to sup-
port his fifth amendment claim. This argument might have been utilized to fashion a
concept of rightful possession not requiring that both ownership and possession of the
documents be vested in the individual raising the fifth amendment to protect himself,
but requiring something more than naked possession. The court's resolution was, however,
cryptic. After strongly indicating that naked possession, even if wrongfully obtained, would
support a privilege claim, the court found that "[i]n any event, Cohen's possession cannot
fairly be characterized as wrongful." 388 F.2d at 470. The court's rationale is less than
clear, but apparently the taxpayer's possession was found to be "rightful" for two rather
tenuous reasons. First, the accountant testified that it was his established practice to
transfer all papers relating to his clients at their request, and that he had always con-
sidered such documents at his client's command. Secondly, because no summons issued to
CASE COMMENTS
ownership will support a fifth amendment claim appears consonant
both with the emphasis that Couch has placed upon "the physical or
moral compulsion exerted" and the concomitant derogation of owner-
ship as a standard for judging fifth amendment claims. The problems
attending a determination of ownership of workpapers illustrate the
disutility of a rationale that does not permit a nonowner possessor to
assert a fifth amendment privilege. It has been held that the existence
the accountant, his request for return was a mere "transmittal" of the revenue agent's
oral request-"scarcely a clear demand by [the owner] that Cohen submit to [the owner's]
superior right." Id. Cohen's exact theoretical foundation is thus unclear. The opinion covers
a gamut of rationales. It rejects ownership as a test, appears to embrace naked pos-
session even if wrongfully obtained as a test, indicates that rightful possession exists
when records are freely transferred, yet indicates that it finds rightful possession in the
case before it partly because the owner of the papers never unequivocally, under force of
process, demanded their return. The result of Cohen, however, is quite clear-a nonowner
possessor rightfully obtained possession of the papers and successfully asserted the priv-
ilege, thus barring production of incriminating accountant's workpapers. It is the proposi-
tion that simple possession, if rightfully obtained, is enough to support a fifth amend-
ment claim that Cohen most clearly supports.
In Widelski the accountant transferred his workpapers to the client after the in-
vestigation began but fifteen months before issuance of the administrative summons. As
in Cohen, the.summons was directed to the taxpayers-possessors. The taxpayers argued
that ownership was not the determinative element and that since they had originally
obtained the papers with the owner's consent, they could now resist the subpoena. The
Sixth Circuit rejected the taxpayers' reliance upon Cohen, finding that decision "against
the weight of authority," and held that the taxpayers could not assert the privilege. The
court was apparently influenced by what it thought to be a lack of bona fides attending
the transfer.
Zakutansky involved the transfer of workpapers from accountant to client after service
of the administrative summons upon the accountant. Although the Seventh Circuit re-
fused the taxpayer's fifth amendment claim, the decision seems to recognize that "right-
ful possession," assumedly distinct from both naked possession and from the existence
of title and ownership in a single person, could support a fifth amendment claim.
Of the three decisions, Widelski is most easily read to reject a rightful possession test
divorced from ownership concepts. Although the accountant-owner of the subpoenaed
papers had transferred his papers to the client freely and apparently had made no sub-
sequent demand for their return, the court still refused to accept the taxpayers' fifth
amendment claim. Because the decision was apparently affected by the "bad faith"
nature of the transfer (being in contemplation of the issuance of the summons), Widelski
might allow a transactionally similar but "good faith" transfer to withstand a subpoena.
Such a distinction, however, would create a concept of "rightful possession" very dif-
ficult to effectively differentiate from de facto ownership.
Moreover, Zakutansky could have been satisfactorily resolved without discussion of
rightful or wrongful possession because the transfer came, as in Couch, after issuance of
the administrative summons. Zakutansky actually used the post-summons nature of the
transfer to establish "wrongful possession" in the taxpayer.
Thus, Cohen alone among these circuit court decisions supports the view that "right-
ful possession," creating in the rightful possessor the right to raise the fifth amendment
privilege, can exist when the possessor is not the owner and in the face of an owner's
demand for the return of his documents. Yet, even Cohen is not a sufficiently clear de-
cision to allow its rationale to be stated with certainty.
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of an agreement between accountant and client vesting title to work-
papers in the taxpayer and entered into before the initiation of an in-
vestigation allows the taxpayer to assert the fifth amendment provided
the taxpayer obtains possession of the papers before the issuance of
the administrative summons.6 3 Acting accordingly, the prudent ac-
countant might adopt a practice of invariably advising his clients to
sign such an agreement at the beginning of the accountant-client re-
lationship. A rule requiring that both ownership and possession be
vested in the person seeking to assert the fifth amendment would thus
unfairly condition the availability of the taxpayer's constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination upon the legal expertise and alertness
of his accountant as well as upon boilerplate forms. A closely related
consideration is the variation in state laws delineating ownership of
accountant's workpapers. Consequently, to make ownership determina-
tive of one's ability to assert the fifth amendment could lead to unde-
sirable variations in the enforcement of the tax laws through the ad-
ministrative summons. Although Couch did not present these questions
for decision, it seems clear that its rationale is destined to have a major
bearing upon their subsequent treatment in the federal courts.
The first important decision dealing with the unresolved issues sur-
rounding accountant's workpapers and constructive possession after
Couch is United States v. White.64 Taxpayers' attorney obtained pos-
session of certain accountant's workpapers after the commencement of
an investigation by a special agent but before the issuance of an ad-
ministrative summons. The summons was subsequently served upon
White, the attorney, who was then in actual possession of the sub-
poenaed workpapers. Although all the workpapers were the property
of the accountant,65 the accountant-owner had agreed with White at
the time of the transfer that White could retain the papers indefinitely
but would return them when his legal representation of the taxpayers
was completed. 6 Enforcement was sought against the attorney after he
had refused to produce the papers in assertion of his clients' fifth
amendment privilege. The taxpayers' motion to intervene in order to
personally raise the privilege claim was denied by the district court.6 7
Drawing the familiar distinction based upon ownership,68 the dis-
63. See note 60 supra.
64. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973), af'g 326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
65. 326 F. Supp. at 461.
66. 477 F.2d at 760.
67. The decision to deny the taxpayers' motion to intervene was later questioned by
the court of appeals. Id. at 759 n.2. It was not considered on appeal, however, because
the taxpayers did not appeal. Id.
68. See note 19 supra.
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trict court rejected the contention that taxpayers constructively pos-
sessed the workpapers through their attorney. Because the workpapers
did not belong to the taxpayers, the court reasoned, they could not have
constructive possession of them.69 The district court also rejected the
idea that the attorney had standing to assert his clients' privilege against
self-incrimination. 70 At the time of the district court's decision Couch
had not been decided by the Supreme Court.
The court of appeals, however, took pains to apply the Couch
rationale in rendering its decision. The court acknowledged the con-
flict of authority over the standing of an attorney to assert his client's
fifth amendment privilege to withhold documents in the attorney's pos-
session. 71 The court did not decide the question, however. Apparently
viewing the attorney's standing to raise his client's constitutional de-
fense as derivative of the client's right to raise it,72 the court assumed,
arguendo, that the attorney could assert his client's privilege if the
client could have done so. 73 After noting the further conflict of author-
ity upon the question of the client's ability to raise the fifth amendment
to withhold documents not belonging to him 7 4 the court turned to
Couch to reject the fifth amendment claim. Emphasizing that it is per-
sonal compulsion directed against the potentially incriminated party
that forms the crux of the privilege against self-incrimination'75 the
court found the taxpayers' claim one of constructive possession:7 6
The lesson to be drawn from Couch, then, is that unless the tax-
payer is actually in possession of documents sought by the govern-
ment-or clearly has constructive possession-he will be unable to
seek the shelter of the fifth amendment because he will not be the
object of any impermissible governmental compulsion. . . . It is
White their attorney who is forced to respond to the governmental
summons. The essence of White's complaint is that potentially in-
criminating information will be divulged to the government, not
that it is being acquired by subjecting the taxpayers to the cruel di-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. The fifth amendment,
69. 326 F. Supp. at 461-62.
70. The district court indicated that on this issue, too, ownership is critical. Ap-
parently the court would allow the attorney to assert his client's fifth amendment
privilege only if the attorney did so to withhold documents owned by the taxpayer-
client. Id. at 462-63; see United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Bouschor
v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); note 19 supra.
71. 477 F.2d at 761-62 & nn.7, 8.
72. See note 19 supra.
73. 477 F.2d at 762.
74. Id. & n.10; see note 19 supra.
75. See pp. 508, 518 supra.
76. 477 F.2d at 763.
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however, protects not against the production of such information but
only against its extraction from the accused himself.
Appellant's best argument is that taxpayers are in constructive
possession of the workpapers because White, the actual possessor,
obtained them only in his capacity as taxpayers' attorney and retained
them only for the sake of convenience in representing them.
The court refused to extend Couch's constructive possession excep-
tions77 to encompass the situation before it. The court noted that, as
would often be the case when dealing with accountant's workpapers,
the taxpayer had never been in actual possession of the subpoenaed
documents. More importantly, however, personal compulsion upon
the taxpayer was absent in the case of a subpoena served upon the at-
torney, who was in possession of the subpoenaed documents.78 Thus it
also appears that the Fifth Circuit will determine the attorney's stand-
ing to assert his client's privilege by a derivative method looking not
to whether the taxpayer could assert the privilege on the assumption
that the taxpayer had actually held the subpoenaed papers, but rather
by looking to whether the taxpayer could assert the privilege in light of
their actual possession at the time the administrative summons issues.
In dissent Judge Ainsworth relied in part upon United States v.
Cohen79 and its favorable citation in Couch. 0 Although Cohen upheld
the ability of an actual possessor nonowner to assert the privilege in
his own behalf, unlike the situation in White, the dissent in the latter
decision would have no difficulty in extending constructive possession
status to the taxpayer and thereby permit the assertion of a fifth amend-
ment claim in his behalf by the actual possessor, his attorney.
Couch's narrow holding, applying only to the facts before it, largely
served to reaffirm the law applicable to a set of circumstances upon
which the courts had rarely disagreed as to the proper result. But the
Court's elevation of protection from direct personal compulsion to a
pre-eminent position in the hierarchy of fifth amendment protections,
and its concomitant derogation of ownership as a criterion in deciding
questions concerning standing to assert the fifth amendment leaves for
future decision the integrity of the courts' traditional stress upon own-
ership in determining "rightful possession" when dealing with taxpayer
efforts to withhold accountant's workpapers. It seems reasonable to be-
lieve that Couch's personal compulsion "test" will sanction the tax-
payer's actions in cases such as Cohen where the taxpayer is in actual
77. See pp. 513-14 supra.
78. 477 F.2d at 763-64.
79. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); see note 62 supra.
80. 409 U.S. at 330 n.12.
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possession of the subpoenaed documents, regardless of their ownership.
Whether the same test should operate to punish the taxpayer for the
transfer of such otherwise protected documents to his attorney by re-
fusing to impute constructive possession to the taxpayer remains ques-
tionable.
Torts-NEGLIGENCE-PLAINTIFF IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION MAY
NOT BE DENIED ANY RECOVERY BECAUSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
OF PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT.-Hoffiman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973).
This action arose as a result of a car-truck collision causing the
death of one William Harrison Jones, Jr. Two wrongful death actions
were filed: one brought by plaintiff in her capacity as Jones' widow
and another in her capacity as administratrix of Jones' estate. Plaintiff
asserted negligence by defendant Hoffman in operating a truck owned
by defendant Pav-A-Way Corporation. Defendants answered with a
general denial and claimed the defense of contributory negligence. The
trial judge consolidated both suits and denied plaintiff's requested in-
struction urging the adoption of a comparative negligence system. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants and plaintiff appealed.
On appeal,' the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by
Judge Mager, reversed and held that contributory negligence did not
bar recovery by the plaintiff, but rather that damages allowed should
be diminished in proportion to the negligence of the person bringing
the action or on behalf of whom the action was brought. Recognizing
that its decision was contrary to the great bulk of traditional Florida
tort law, and that a question of significant public interest was involved,
the district court certified its decision to the Florida Supreme Court for
a holding on the following question: "Whether or not the Court should
replace the contributory negligence rule with the principle of com-
parative negligence?' '2
On review, the Florida Supreme Court, after chastising the district
court for exceeding its proper authority by disregarding a previously
binding supreme court decision, 3 agreed in substance with the district
1. Jones v. Hoffman, 272 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
2. Id. at 533.
3. The district court's decision was contrary to the Florida Supreme Court's adoption
of contributory negligence in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886).
This refusal to follow precedent caused the supreme court to define clearly the limits of
a district court's authority: "[The district courts] are free to certify questions of great
public interest to this Court for consideration, and even to state their reasons for advocat-
1973]
